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Death and Property Rights in New Brunswick 
Recent Developments
INTRODUCTION
Proclamation of the Marital Property A ct1 as o f January 1, 1981 has 
effected some significant changes in the law o f New Brunswick 
regarding testamentary dispositions and inheritance rights. Subsequent 
proclamation of the Child and Family Services and Family Relation's Act2 will 
produce further changes in those areas o f the law.
The modest purpose o f this practice note is to identify and describe 
those changes. While some observations will be made and questions 
raised concerning those matters, time and space do not permit the 
undertaking of the extensive analysis required to provide probable 
answers. It is hoped, however, that the observations which are made will 
assist the reader in finding appropriate answers.
MARITAL PROPERTY ACT 
Division of Marital Property on Death
The M arital Property Act provides for a number o f circumstances in 
which a spouse may make application for the division o f marital 
property. T he death o f a spouse is included among them. The surviving 
spouse is entitled, upon application to the Court, to have the marital 
property divided in equal shares.3
It is to be noted that the Act does not effect a vesting of property in 
the surviving spouse.4 Rather, it provides the survivor with the means of 
obtaining a share of the deceased spouse’s estate. If, therefore, the 
survivor does not make an application, the Act does not govern the 
disposition of the deceased’s estate.
If an application is made, the survivor’s rights to a division of the 
marital property supersede any disposition of the estate effected by 
the deceased’s will or the Devolution of Estates Act. 5 That is not say,
'S.N.B. 1980. t. M -I.l.
*S.N.B. 1980, c. G-2.1. It is anticipated that this Act will be brought into force in early April, 1981. 
*Su(na, footnote I, at s. 4(1).
*lbid., at s. 47.
Mbid.. at s. 4(4). The intent of this provision is not without doubt because of the language which it 
employs. It would seem, however, that the intention is to displace the provisions o f the will or the* 
Devolution oj Estates Act. R.S.N.B. 1973, c. D-9 only to the extent that they are inconsistent with an order 
made pursuant to Section 4( 1).
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however, that the obtaining of a division o f the marital property 
disqualifies the spouse from sharing otherwise in the deceased's testate 
or intestate estate. The survivor may share in the estate which remains 
after the share of the marital property has been removed. Indeed, the 
surviving spouse may be a successful applicant under both the Marital 
Property Act and the Testators Family Maintenance Act.6 Presumably, 
however, the results of the former application would influence the Court 
in its decision on the latter one.
While an application under the Marital Property Act does not 
disqualify the applicant from taking under the will, such disqualification 
may result from the terms of the will. Those terms may be such as to 
force the surviving spouse to elect between the benefits under the will 
and the share of the marital property. This is similar to the traditional 
rights o f  the testator to put the surviving spouse to an election as 
regards dower rights.7 It is clearly a matter which should be given due 
consideration in the drafting of spouses’ wills.
The division to which the surviving spouse is entitled is an equal 
share of the marital property, including the deceased spouse’s interest in 
the marital home. The latter is, however, subject to the discretion of the 
Court which may make such other order as it considers fair and 
equitable in the circumstances. Those circumstances are the considera­
tions set forth in Section 7.
While the terms of Section 4(1) appear to limit the C ourt’s discretion 
to the disposition of the marital home, the introductory words o f Section 
7 seem clearly to extend that discretion to the division o f the marital 
property generally. In the result, the surviving spouse may obtain from 
the estate such share of the marital property as the Court considers 
equitable.
An application under Section 4(1) may result in a division of assets 
of the estate which do not fall within the definition of marital property. 
U nder Section 8 the discretion of the Court is extended beyond the 
scope o f marital property. The executor or administrator cannot safely 
assume, therefore, that non-marital property may be freely dealt with 
pending an application under Section 4(1). Indeed, a restraining order 
issued under Section 1 1 may extend to any property that may be divided 
under the Act and is not restricted, therefore, to marital property.
•R.S.N.B. 1973, c .T -4 .
7Such an election is no longer relevant since the Act, by Section 49, has abolished both the common law 
right o f dower and those rights created by the D ow n Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. D-13. While Section 49(3) 
has preserved any dower right which "vested in possession" before January I, 1981, it is not clear 
whether the intention is to extend such protection to all dower rights which crystallized by virtue o f the 
husband's death prior to January 1st or only those rights which the widow had commenced to enjoy in 
possession before that time.
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It is to be noted as well that the estate may include more than one 
property which satisfies the definition o f “marital home”. This is a 
consequence of the concept of “marital home” as set forth in Section 16, 
and is recognized to be so by Section 17. It is not clear whether Section 
4(1) contemplates that the surviving spouse should acquire the deceased 
spouse’s interest in each property which qualifies as a marital home 
under Section 16. It is clear, however, that the Court does have the 
discretion to deny any such claim in appropriate circumstances. 
Consequently, a claim o f entitlement to more than one marital home 
may be denied.
The Application under Section 4(1)
An application under Section 4(1) is to be made within sixty days 
after the death o f the deceased spouse. This time limit may be extended 
by the Court for cause. Should the applicant die before a decision is 
rendered the application may be continued by the applicant’s estate. 
I his may be of particular significance to the beneficiaries of the 
surviving spouse’s estate in circumstances where they might not stand to 
benefit from the deceased spouse’s estate. If, for example, the deceased 
husband’s will makes the surviving wife’s benefits contingent upon her 
surviving him by a specified period, it would appear advisable that an 
application be made under Section 4(1) for the benefit of her 
beneficiaries should she fail to qualify to take under the will. 
Presumably, such an application can be withdrawn if subsequent 
developments should so dictate.
The fact that an application can be continued after the applicant’s 
death is indicative o f the premise and philosophy which underlie the 
Marital Property Act. The spouse’s entitlement to a share of the marital 
property arises out of the partnership of the marriage and not because 
of any state or relationship of dependence. This is in sharp contrast with 
the premise, if not the application, of the Testators Family Maintenance 
Act. The following table indicates important differences between the two 
Acts.
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Section 4(1) o f  the 
Marital Property Act
1. An application may be made whether 
the spouse dies testate, intestate, or 
both.




1. An application may be made only if 
the spouse dies testate, in whole or in 
part.11
2. An application  
applicant.13
d ies with the
3. The applicant must be granted a share 
o f  the deceased’s estate.8
4. The applicant must assume a fair and 
equitable share o f  the marital debts.10
5. T he application takes precedence over 
one made under the Testators Family 
Maintenarue Act. 11
6. T he Act does not provide a specific 
right o f  appeal from an order.
3. An application may be refused.14
4. The applicant does not assume any 
debts o f  the estate.
5. T he authority o f  the Court is subject 
to the rights o f the surviving spouse to 
a division o f  marital property.
6. T he Act does provide a specific right 
o f  appeal from an order.15
Domestic Contracts
Section 40 of the Marital Property Act provides that "where there is 
a conflict between a provision of this Act and a domestic contract the 
domestic contract prevails”. By Section 34 the ownership in or division 
of property upon death may be provided for by an agreement 
entered into by a man and a woman before their marriage or during 
their marriage while cohabitating. In this way the right to a division of 
property under Section 4(1) may be barred. By contrast, the right to 
apply under the Testators Family Maintenance Act may not be so barred. 
An attempt to do so is unenforceable as an attempt to oust the 
authority of the C ourt.16
8Supra, footnote I at s. 5(3).
•While Section 7, Marital Property Act authorizes the Court to make an unequal division o f the marital
property there is no indication that it may deny the applicant any share whatever.
ltSupra, footnote 1, at s. 9.
"Ibid.. at s. 4(6).
,fSupra, footnote 6, at s. 2(1), s. 2(4).
'*Rf McMasUr (1957), 21 W.W.R. 603 (Alta. S.C.).
'*Supra, footnote 6, at s. 2(1), s. 2(3).
,slbid.. at s. 18.
'*Rr Edwards (1962), 31 D.L.R. (2d) 308 (Alta. C.A.).
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The Marital Property Act does not purport to clothe a domestic 
contract with testamentary character. Presumably, therefore, it is to be 
treated like any other contract by which a party undertakes to dispose 
o f property in a certain m anner on death. An inter vivos disposition 
which would render the covenantor unable to fulfil his undertaking 
may give rise to an action for breach o f contract.17 Where there is no 
inter vivos breach but the covenantor’s will fails to dispose of the 
estate in satisfaction of the domestic contract the surviving spouse may 
take action against the estate.18
Section 41 authorizes the Court to disregard any provision of a 
domestic contract if it was made before January 1, 1981 and was not 
made in contemplation of the legislation. As well, a spouse may 
challenge a domestic contract which was entered into without the 
benefit o f independent legal advice. The apparent purpose o f those 
provisions is to enable the surviving spouse to get around the 
domestic contract so as to be entitled to make application for a 
division of marital property under the Act.
Where the deceased spouse has failed to comply with the terms of 
a domestic contract the survivor may be entitled to treat the contract 
as inoperative and to apply under the Act for a division. This could 
be o f considerable advantage to the surviving spouse.
An interesting question arises as to the relationship between a 
testamentary disposition made pursuant to a domestic contract and 
the operation of the Testators Family Maintenance Act. Section 16 of that 
Act provides as follows:
16. Where a testator, in his lifetime bona fide and for valuable consideration, 
has entered into a contract to devise and bequeath any property real or 
personal and has by his will devised or bequeathed such property in 
accordance with the provisions o f  the contract such property shall not be 
liable to the provisions o f  an order made under this Act except to the extent 
that the value o f  the property in the opinion o f  the judge exceeds the 
consideration received by the testator therefor.
Wrhere a testator devises or bequeaths property to his spouse 
pursuant to a domestic contract how is the value o f the consideration 
received by the testator to be measured? If the value so determined is 
less than the value of the property left to the surviving spouse then the 
excess could become subject to an order made on an application by the 
testator’s children. On the other hand, if the surviving spouse takes by 
way of division under the Marital Property Act such division is not subject 
to reduction by an order under the Testators Family Maintenance Act. 19
18Re Davidson (1947), 20 M.P.R. 53 (N.B. C.A.).
'*Supra, footnote 1, at s. 4(6).
nSynge 8c Synge, [1894] I Q.B 466 (C.A.).
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Where a will contains provisions which are intended to carry out the 
terms of a marriage contract or separation agreement, care must be 
taken to ensure that that intention is clearly reflected in the will. 
Otherwise, the surviving spouse may enjoy a double benefit by being 
entitled to take under the will and to sue the estate pursuant to the 
contract.
CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES AND FAMILY RELATIONS ACT 
Adopted Children
Section 33 of the Adoption Act20 makes provision for inheritance by 
and from adopted children on an intestacy. The effects of those 
provisions may be summarized as follows:
(a) An adopted child inherits from the adopting parents as though he were 
their natural born child.
(b) An adopted child inherits from the issue o f  the adopting parents as 
though he were the natural born child o f  those adopting parents.
(c) An adopted child does not inherit from the ascendants or collateral 
relations o f  the adopting parents.
(d) An adopted child inherits from the natural parents and kindred as 
though the adoption had not taken place.
(e) The adopting parents and their kindred inherit from the adopting child 
any property which he acquired by his own efforts or by gift or inheritance 
from the adopting parents or their kindred.
(0  The adopted child’s natural parents and kindred inherit from him any 
property which he received by gift or inheritance from the natural parents or 
kindred.
In the case of an adopted child who was born illegitimate only the 
mother and maternal kindred fall within the scope of natural kindred 
for inheritance purposes.
By Section 85(l)(a) of the Child and Family Services and Family 
Relations Act (the “new Act”), the adopted child becomes the child of the 
adopting parents for all purposes including inheritance from the 
kindred of the adopting parents. This has the effect of bringing the 
adopting parents’ ascendants and collateral relations within the scope of 
those from whom the adopted child may inherit. Although no specific 
reference is made to the rights of the adopting parents and their 
kindred to inherit from the adopted child, the effect of that provision 
would appear to be that those persons may inherit from the adopted
l0 R .S . N . B .  19 73 , c. A -3 .
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child as though he had been born to the adopting parents. On that basis 
the distinction which Section 33 of the Adoption Act draws between the 
sources of the adopted child’s property will be eliminated thus making 
all o f the child’s estate inheritable by the adopting parents and their 
kindred.
By Section 82(2)(c) of the new Act the right of the adopted child to 
inherit from his natural parents and kindred is terminated unless the 
adoption order specifically preserves such right in accordance with the 
express wishes of the natural parent. It is possible, therefore, for the 
adopted child’s dual rights of inheritance to be preserved. There is no 
provision, however, for preservation o f the right of the adopted child’s 
natural parents and kindred to inherit from him.
Section 34 o f the Adoption Act provides that the word “child” or its 
equivalent in any instrument shall include an adopted child unless the 
contrary intention plainly appears by the terms of the instrument. There 
is no such provision in the new Act. Is this likely to have any effect on 
the interpretation of wills?
The answer probably lies in the construction and application of 
Section 85(1 )(a) o f the new Act which provides, in effect, that an 
adoption order gives the adopted child, for all purposes, the same status 
as if he had been born to the adopting parents. It is to be presumed that 
the interpretation of wills is one o f those purposes. While this ought not 
to be construed as interfering with the testator’s right to exclude 
adopted children from the benefits provided by his will, the Courts will 
probably require stronger evidence of such an intention than in the past. 
The very clear intention o f the Legislature to establish the position of 
the adopted child fully and firmly within the adopting family is not 
likely to be easily avoided.21
Illegitimate Children
Section 34 of the Devolution of Estates Act provides for inheritance by 
illegitimates and their issue. They may inherit from the illegitimate’s 
m other and his maternal ascendants and collateral relations as though 
he were legitimate.
The illegitimate may also inherit from his own spouse and issue 
because the fact of his illegitimacy is irrelevant for that purpose. 
Similarly, the illegitimate’s surviving spouse and issue may inherit from 
him as though he were legitimate.
If, however, the illegitimate is not survived by a spouse or issue then 
the normal rules of intestate succession do not apply. In such a case
" R e  Barthelmes, [1973] 1 O.R. 752, (1971), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 325 (Ont. H.C.). See also Sheard, Terrance, 
“Adopted Children”, (1973) 21 Chitty's L.J. 150.
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inheritance is governed by Section 35 which restricts such rights to the 
illegitimate’s mother and to the m other’s other children and 
grandchildren.
The new Act repeals Sections 34 and 35 of the Devolution of Estates 
Act. Section 96(4) of the new Act provides as follows:
Any distinction between the status o f  children born in wedlock and born out 
o f  wedlock is abolished and the relationship o f  parent and child and kindred 
relationships flowing therefrom shall be determined in accordance with this 
section.
Consequently, inheritance by, from or through a person born outside 
marriage will be governed by Sections 22 o f 32 of the Devolution of Estates 
Act. To ensure the full application of those provisions the definition of 
“issue” under the Interpretation Act22 has been amended to include all 
lineal descendants o f the ancestor, not just the “lawful” lineal 
descendants as has been the case.
If the person born outside marriage is subsequently adopted then 
the provisions of the Act respecting the inheritance rights o f adopted 
children apply.23
Since both the child’s natural parents and their kindred are brought 
fully within the scope of the Devolution of Estates Act, the provisions 
respecting determination of parentage are most important. It would 
appear that doubt as to maternity can only be resolved by means of an 
application for a declaratory order under Section 100( 1) of the new Act. 
Presumably such an application may be made even though the child or 
the putative mother, or both, are dead.
As regards paternity it appears that a person such as an 
administrator of an estate is entitled to rely upon any presumption 
which arises under Section 103(1). A person wishing to challenge the 
applicability of such a presumption must apparently make application 
under Section 103(1). A person wishing to challenge the applicability o f 
such a presumption must apparently make application under Section 
100(1) for a declaratory order. Similarly, it seems to be open to the 
administrator to make an application under Section 100(1) to seek 
confirmation of the applicability o f such presumption. An application to 
have a presumption o f paternity confirmed or displaced may be made 
even if the child or putative father, or both, are dead.24
Where, however, the circumstances do not give rise to a 
presumption of paternity under Section 103(1) an application may be
” R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 1-13. 
i3Supra, fcxMnote 2, at s. 96(2).
*4This appears to be the necessary implication o f Section 100(5).
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made under Section 100(1). An order may be made in such circumstances 
only if both the man and the child were living at the time the application 
was made.25 If, therefore, there is no presumption of paternity, the 
timing of an application for a declaratory order is crucial. It must be 
brought inter vivos the parties. It is to be anticipated that this 
requirement will have the effect o f preventing the successful pursuit of 
some legitimate inheritance claims.
The elimination o f the concept o f illegitimacy is extended to the 
interpretation of wills and other instruments by Section 97(1) which 
provides as follows:
97(1) For the purposes o f  construing any instrument, Act or regulation, 
unless the contrary intention appears, a reference to a person or group or 
class o f  persons described in terms o f  relationship by bl(x>d or marriage to 
another person shall be construed to refer to or include a person who comes 
within the relationship o f  parent and child as determined under section 96.
While application o f the provision is made subject to the contrary 
intention of, for example, a testator, it is improbable that such an 
intention will arise readily by implication. The very strong statement of 
public policy which is inherent in Section 96 is unlikely to give way to a 
contrary intention which is not clearly expressed.26
Section 97(1) is not intended to have retroactive effect. By Section 
97(2)(¿) it is made applicable to instruments made on or after the 
coming into force o f Part VI. An interesting and important question 
arises as to whether a will made prior to the effective date o f Part VI but 
republished after that date will be subject to the new provisions. It is 
arguable that republication does not constitute the "making” of an 
instrument in the sense o f 97(2)(6) and ought not, therefore, to bring a 
will into the new system. It is also arguable that the doctrine of 
republication is to be used only to give effect to a testator’s intention, not 
to defeat it.27
Recognizing that such arguments may not succeed it is recom­
mended that a codicil to a will which predated Part VI should contain a 
provision excluding children born outside marriage if that is the 
testator’s intention. One such provision which has been suggested for 
use under the Succession Law Reform Act o f Ontario would be equally 
useful in New Brunswick. It provides as follows:
Any reference in my will or this or any codicil to a person in terms o f  
relationship to another person determined by blood or marriage shall not 
include a person born outside marriage nor a person who comes within the
2iSupra, footnote 2, at s. 100(5).
2tSupra, footnote 21.
27In Re Heath, [1949] 1 All E.R. 199 (Ch.D.).
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description traced through another person who was born outside marriage, 
provided that any person who has been legally adopted shall be regarded as 
having been born in lawful wedlock to his or her adopting parent and any 
person who is born outside marriage and whose natural parents subsequently 
marry shall be regarded as having been born in lawful wedlock.28
The concluding portion of that provision would preserve for 
purposes o f the will the effect o f the Legitimation Act29 as a result o f the 
subsequent marriage o f the child’s natural parents. That Act is repealed 
by the new Act since it no longer serves any need.30
BASIL D. STAPLETON*
2SThis precedent is contained in a lecture by David Fuller on the Succession Law Reform Act. S.O. 1977, c. 
40, published by the Department o f Continuing Education, The Law Society o f  Upper Canada, 
Osgoode Hall, Toronto.
’»R.S.N.B. 1973, c. L-4.
stSupra, footnote, 2 at s. 156.
*B.A., B.Comm. (Memorial University o f Newfoundland). B.C.L. (U.N.B.) Associate Professor, Faculty 
o f Law, University o f New Brunswick.
